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Abstract—Data in smart cities is commonly generated by
a large variety of participants including institutional actors,
equipment manufacturers, network operators, infrastructure
providers, service providers, and end users. This data potentially
undergoes several transformations such as aggregation and/or
composition before finally being consumed. In this context of
sharing data between diverse consumers, it is essential to provide
the data producers the means by which they can exercise control
over how and by whom the data is used. To date, usage
control has received attention in the domains of the web and
social networks, in terms of confidentiality, privacy and access
control aspects. However, it has not yet been fully applied in
a rigorous manner in the context of smart cites. In this paper
we study usage control with the goal to address the problem of
providing stakeholders more control over their data and enforcing
accountable management of such data. We first propose a new
data usage policy, called DUPO, which captures the diversity
of obligations and constraints resulting from the usage control
requirements for smart cities. Next, we apply a defeasible logic
based approach on DUPO to formally define rule language, solve
rule conflicts, and elaborate reasoning. We then introduce the
data handling mechanism, which provides useful functionality
to process consumer’s request, ensuring the accountability of
the policy enforcement, and traceability of the data usage. To
this end we benefit from SPINdle reasoner to implement the
proposed usage control module covered main functionalities of
the mechanism.
Keywords—Defeasible Logic, Usage Control, Data Handling,
Smart Cities, and Information Accountability.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are witnessing a new communication paradigm which
goes beyond traditional people interactions, the one that is
between devices under the umbrella of the Internet of Things
(IoT) and the underlying technologies. In the very near future,
most of the defined plans and ideas for smart cities will become
a reality. In this era, deployment of the shared platforms
for IoT enables the participation of citizens and groups of
users in both the data collection and the emergence of new
smart city services. Data can be collected from billions of
interactions across a huge number of devices, forever altering
the socioeconomic landscape [3]. In effect, it is the emergence
of a marketplace for smart cities.
Currently, applications for smart cities are mostly devel-
oped in a vertical manner with no sharing of resources between
different applications. Many of these vertical applications may
benefit from using information sources from different origins
to enhance their own services. These resources include the
devices and the networks that are deployed but also the data
generated by these devices. The landscape involves a diversity
of actors, both public and private, who participate to provide
a large variety of services. These applications include energy
management for public buildings, waste management, public
lighting, mobility management including intelligent parking
solutions and a range of new services that are being conceived
for smart cities [2]. The actors involved in these applications
tend to vary with the specific domain as each comes with its
ecosystem. However we can identify several broad categories
of actors: institutional actors (such as districts, municipalities),
equipment manufacturers, network operators, infrastructure
providers and service providers. With the development of
IoT, the range of actors involved will be enlarged to in-
clude micro companies, value added service providers (such
as aggregations, compositions and mashups) and end users.
The need for a horizontal platform to federate information
from these disparate sources is particularly important [4]. The
shared platform, which can be provided by the operator, for
actors with differing and sometimes contradictory requirements
brings its own set of challenges. For this horizontal approach to
succeed, the platform needs to ensure that the business interests
of the different participants are fully honored.
In the context of IoT current studies provide mechanisms
such as access control or address privacy issues. However the
issue of usage control has not been treated in a formal manner.
In this paper we focus on the following challenges (i) A
language for IoT data producers to express the constraints and
obligations on the use of IoT data, (ii) The mechanisms to
enforce the policies that have been put in place in the context
of a shared data platform, and (iii) Accounting mechanisms
to prove to the data producers that their policies have been
respected. More specifically, we need a machine-interpretable
model and a language for the constraints and conditions that
can be used and understood by all actors who are involved
in, covering (i) Spatio-temporal granularity, (ii) Abstraction/-
masking of certain information, and (iii) Conditions by class
of actor/purpose.
The main contributions of this paper are two-fold: Firstly,
we propose a new data usage policy, called DUPO, and define
its conceptual model, as well as a formal language based
on defeasible logic, and a practical expression of DUPO.
Secondly, a data handling mechanism is provided, in which
we indicate an overview of the mechanism in perspectives of
data owners, data consumers, and IoT shared platform. Next,
we initial implement the Usage Control Module that covers
the main functionalities of the mechanism.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes use case scenarios and section III discusses DUPO.
Section IV presents the data handling mechanism, section V
indicates related works and we conclude in Section VI.
II. USE CASE SCENARIOS
To illustrate our contributions, we introduce the architec-
ture of a general scenario with a use case for fine-granular
sensor data collection in the context of smart cities.
Fig. 1: Overall Architecture of the Use Case Scenario.
Fig. 1 shows the overall architecture, including the main
components for our use case scenarios. A variety of smart city
services communicate to a shared platform called Smart City
Management platform. Examples of such services include in-
telligent parking solutions, waste management, public lighting,
air quality monitoring, and participatory sensing applications,
etc. The goal of the shared platform is to allow diverse
applications to access data collected from a variety of sensors
deployed over a large area. A critical element to enable such
sharing is the possibility for data providers to exercise some
control the usage of the data generated by their sensors. The
Usage Control Module ensures that policies put in place by
the data producers are respected by data consumers.
We could have different applications, aParking for actors
to be used for tracking the parking spaces in a city during a
specific time in the intelligent parking solution, aWaste for
waste management, aLighting for a public lighting system,
aAir for air quality monitoring, and aPS for participatory
sensing, etc. sharing a common platform and some of their
data between different them.
In the sections that follow we have chosen to illustrate
Usage Control using an intelligent parking solution. Intelligent
parking is a hot topic and several studies have proposed
solutions in this domain [5]. This sort of solution is also
available on the market and their integration is quite simple [1].
The data provider for this solution decides to share the data
generated by parking sensors and apply a policy to control
the usage of this parking data. Different participants such as
municipal authorities, application developers and commercial
operators could then request data from the parking solution
and will be able to access data at the granularity and scope
that the data producer has specified. In the following, we use
examples to illustrate the usage control policy:
1) The data owner (the company that deploys and is owner
of the parking sensors) will have full access to all the details
generated by all the individual parking sensors.
2) For municipal authorities, the data owner is willing to
make available average occupancy of parking places per street
on an hourly basis.
3) However to commercial operators only statistical data
will be made available over a zone and on a weekly basis.
We finally need the Usage Control Module in this scenario
to deal with several questions as follows: (i) How do we
define the required policies? (ii) What are the main criteria
to define the policies? (iii) How do we ensure that these
policies enforced correctly? (iv) How do we deal with potential
incompatibilities between dependent policies? (v) How do we
process the consumers’ request and offer an explanation when
the request is refused? and (vi) How do we trace data usage
history?
III. DUPO: DATA USAGE POLICY
This section introduces the new data usage policy, called
DUPO, which includes the conceptual model, formal language,
and practical expressions.
A. Conceptual Model
In Fig. 2, we propose a conceptual data usage model
that allows a usage policy to be attached to a data set, a
collection of data items. The policy is created by defining
modal operators (Obligation, Forbidden, and Permission) on
usage constraints and conditions: (i) class of actors, (ii)
constraints (Spatiality, Temporality, and Abstraction), and (iii)
class of purposes.
Fig. 2: Conceptual Data Usage Policy Model.
We aim to explain by examples how this model works.
Let’s consider that a commercial operator requests all the
details of parking data over a street on an hourly basis.
However, we have already the usage policy in the scenario
that commercial operators are permitted only statistical data
over a zone on a weekly basis. Thus, the consumer’s request
is refused. Otherwise, the related data items will be returned.
This example basically covers the usage control requirements
and related concepts in our model:
Actor = (CommercialOperator),
Abstraction = (Detail, StatisticalData),
Spatiality = (StreetLevel, ZoneLevel),
T emporality = (Hourly,Weekly),
Operator = (Permission,Obligation).
Next we present each component of the model in detail.
1) Data Items: A Data Item is an individual of the Context
Element proposed in the NGSI 9/10 Information Model1. The
Context Element is a container used to exchange information
about an entity. It contains the following information: (i)
an entity ID including the name and the type, (ii) a list
of the context attributes, (iii) (optionally) the name of an
attribute domain that logically groups together a set of context
attributes, and (iv) (optionally) a list of metadata that apply
to all the attribute values of the given domain. We formally
define it by using XML DTD, as mentioned in Listing 1.
1 <!DOCTYPE DUPO[
2 <!ELEMENT DataItem(ContextElement)>
3 <!ELEMENT ContextElement(EntityID,
AttributeDomainName?, ContextAttributeList,
DomainMetadata?)>
4 <!ELEMENT EntityID(Id, Type)>
5 <!ELEMENT ContextAttributeList(ContextAttribute*)
>
6 <!ELEMENT ContextAttribute(Name, Type,
ContextValue, ContextMetadata+)>
7 <!ELEMENT DomainMetadata(ContextMetadata*)>
8 <!ELEMENT ContextMetadata(Name, Type, Value)>
9 ...
10 ]>
Listing 1: XML DTD Definition of Data Item.
2) Usage Constraints and Conditions: This is a collection
of individual Conditions. The condition list optionally con-
tains the following expressions:(i) Temporal Constraints for
temporal granularity, (ii) Spatial Constraints for spatial gran-
ularity, (iii) Abstraction Constraints for masking of certain
information, (iv) Conditions by Actors, and (v) Conditions
by Purposes. We formally define it by using XML DTD, as
shown in Listing 2.
1 <!DOCTYPE DUPO[
2 <!ELEMENT Condition(Temporality*, Spatiality*,
Abstraction*, Actor*, Purpose*)>
3 <!ELEMENT Spatiality(SpatialScope*)>
4 <!ELEMENT Temporality(TemporalScope*)>
5 <!ELEMENT Abstraction(AbstractScope*)>
6 <!ELEMENT Actor(ActorScope*)>
7 <!ELEMENT Purpose(PurposeScope*)>
8 <!ELEMENT TemporalScope(Secondly?, Minutly?,
Hourly?, Daily?, Weekly?, Monthly?, Yearly?,
Any?)>
9 <!ELEMENT SpatialScope(Space?, Slot?, Street?,
Zone?, Any?)>
10 <!ELEMENT ActorScope(DataOwner?,
MulnicipalAuthority?, ComercicalOperator?)>
11 <!ELEMENT AbstractScope(Aggregation?, Detail?,
Any?)>
12 <!ELEMENT PurposeScope(CommercialUse?, Any?)>
13 ...
14 ]>
Listing 2: XML DTD Definition of Condition.
3) Operators: This is a set of model operators (i) Obliga-
tion (ii) Forbidden, and (iii) Permission. The formal definition
created using XML DTD is presented in Listing 3.
1 <!DOCTYPE DUPO[
2 <!ELEMENT Operator(Obligation?, Forbidden?,
Permission?)>
3 ...
4 ]>
Listing 3: XML DTD Definition of Operator.
1NGSI 9/10 Information Model: https://forge.fiware.org/plugins/mediawiki/
wiki/fiware/index.php/NGSI-9/NGSI-10 information model
4) Usage Policies: A collection of rules which is created
by defining Operators on the individual Condition. Listing 4
formally defines the definition of Usage Policies using XML
DTD.
1 <!DOCTYPE DUPO[
2 <!ELEMENT UsagePolicy(Rule*)>
3 <!ELEMENT Rule(Operator?, Condition?)>
4 ...
5 ]>
Listing 4: XML DTD Definition of Usage Policy.
B. Formal Language
Defeasible Logic (DL) is a non-monotonic formalism that
deals with incomplete and conflicting information, originally
proposed by Nute [11]. The Data Usage Policy proposed
in this paper (DUPO) is based on the general concept of
DL. In particular, we build on earlier works extending DL
with modal and deontic operators, as presented in Governatori
[14] [15] and Antoniou [13] [16]. There are some proposed
formalisms for dealing with reasoning, handling and solving
the normative conflicts that arise between rules and exceptions.
However, DL is one of the best solutions which can manage all
aspects in an efficient and computationally tractable way [15].
Moreover, DL offers enhanced representational capabilities and
low computational complexity [12]. According to [14], when
DL is enriched with modal operators, the complexity also does
not increase in most cases. In this section, we define the formal
language as follows:
Let PROP be a set of propositional atom. A set of literals
Lit = PROP ∪ {¬p|p ∈ PROP}.
Let MOD = {O,P, F} be the set of basic deontic
modalities (Obligation, Permission, and Forbidden). A set of
modal literals ModLit = {[X]l,¬[X]l|l ∈ Lit,X ∈MOD}.
Let Lbl be a set of arbitrary labels. R is a set of base and
deontic rules. A base rule is expressed r : A(r) ↪→ C(r), while
a deontic rule is r : A(r) ↪→X C(r), where (i) A unique label
r ∈ Lbl, (ii) The antecedent (or body) A(r) = a1, ..., an,
ai ∈ Lit ∪ModLit, 1 ≤ i ≤ n; (iii) An arrow ↪→∈ {→,⇒
,;}, denotes the type of rules: strict rules, defeasible rules
and defeaters, respectively, (iv) X ∈ MOD, and (v) The
consequent (or head) C(r) = b, b ∈ Lit.
The different rules have the following meaning. The strict
rules can never be defeated, while defeasible rules can be
defeated by contrary evidence. Defeater rules are only used
to prevent certain conclusions.
1) DUPO Theory: A DUPO theory is a defeasible theory
D = (FDUPO, RDUPO, >), where i)FDUPO ⊆ Lit ∪
ModLit are facts, ii)RDUPO ⊆ R is a set of rules from
usage policies, and iii) > is a superiority relation for priorities
among the non-strict rules in RDUPO.
2) Theory Proof: A conclusion derived from D is a tagged
literal and is classified as follows: +∆q means that literal q is
definitely provable in D; −∆q means that literal q is definitely
rejected in D; +∂q means that literal q is defeasibly provable
in D; and −∂q means that literal q is defeasibly rejected in
D.
A proof P = (P (1), ..., P (n)) in D is a finite sequence of
tagged literals of type +∆q, −∆q, +∂q and −∂q.
We denote the set of all strict rules in R by Rs, Rsd for
the set of strict and defeasible rules, and R[q] for the set of
rules whose head is q. P [1..i] denotes the initial part of the
sequence of length i. The proof conditions for the conclusions
are formally defined as follows [13]:
+∆ : If P (i + 1) = +∆q then either
(1) q ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rs[q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P [1..i].
−∆ : If P (i + 1) = −∆q then
(1) q /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rs[q]∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P [1..i].
+∂ : If P (i + 1) = +∂q then either
(1)+∆q ∈ P [1..i] or
(2)(2.1)∃r ∈ Rsd[q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P [1..i] and
(2.2)-∆¬q ∈ P [1..i] and
(2.3)∀s ∈ R[¬q] either
(2.3.1)∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P [1..i] or
(2.3.2)∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P [1..i] and t > s.
−∂ : If P (i + 1) = −∂q then
(1)−∆q ∈ P [1..i] and
(2)(2.1)∀r ∈ Rsd[q]∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P [1..i] or
(2.2)+∆¬q ∈ P [1..i] or
(2.3)∃s ∈ R[¬q] such that
(2.3.1)∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P [1..i] and
(2.3.2)∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P [1..i] or t ≯ s.
C. Practical Expression
In this part, we use our formal language to express facts,
rules for usage policies, and consumer’s request related to the
use case examples. We also present an example of data items.
1) Facts: We have a fact about a commercial operator
(CO) that wish to request the data. It is presented as follows:
FDUPO = {CommercialOperator(CO)}
2) Rules: We express all of usage policies related to the
use case scenarios. For the data owners (DO), they have the
permission to full access of all the details. This policy is
represented with the use of defeasible rules, as follows:
RDUPO = {r1,d : DO ⇒P TemporalScope(any),
r2,d : DO ⇒P SpatialScope(any),
r3,d : DO ⇒P AbstractScope(any),
r4,d : DO ⇒P PurposeScope(any)}
For municipal authorities (MA), they have permission
to access available average occupancy of parking places
(aggregation) per street on an hourly basis. This policy is
represented with the use of defeasible rules, as follows:
RDUPO = {r1,m : MA⇒P SpatialScope(street),
r2,m : MA⇒F ¬SpatialScope(street),
r3,m : MA⇒P TemporalScope(hourly),
r4,m : MA⇒F ¬TemporalScope(hourly),
r5,m : MA⇒P AbstractScope(aggregation),
r6,m : MA⇒F ¬AbstractScope(aggregation)}
For commercial operators (CO), only statistical data will
be made available over a zone and on a weekly basis. This
policy is represented with the use of defeasible rules, as
follows:
RDUPO = {r1,c : CO ⇒P SpatialScope(zone),
r2,c : CO ⇒F ¬SpatialScope(zone),
r3,c : CO ⇒P TemporalScope(weekly),
r4,c : CO ⇒F ¬TemporalScope(weekly),
r5,c : CO ⇒P AbstractScope(statistic),
r6,c : CO ⇒F ¬AbstractScope(statistic)}
3) Consumer’s Request: We have a consumer’s request that
a commercial operator (CO) requests all the detail of the
parking data over a street on a hourly basis. This request is
represented with the use of defeasible rules, as follows:
r : CO, [P ]SpatialScope(street),
[P ]TemporalScope(hourly),
[P ]AbstractionScope(detail)
⇒O ConsumerRequest
We have the conlusions, −∆[O]ConsumerRequest,
−∂[O]ConsumerRequest. It means that ConsumerRequest
is not defeasible provable in D, so the request is refused.
4) Data Items: In the Listing 5, we describe a data item
example using Context Element XML format. It contains the
current state (line 9) of the parking sensor (line 3) in location
(line 14) at timestamp (line 21).
1 <contextElement>
2 <entityId type="ParkingSensor" >
3 <id>ps1</id>
4 </entityId>
5 <contextAttributeList>
6 <contextAttribute>
7 <name>currentState</name>
8 <type>integer</type>
9 <contextValue>1</contextValue>
10 </contextAttribute>
11 <contextAttribute>
12 <name>location</name>
13 <type>string</type>
14 <contextValue>parkingspace1</contextValue>
15 </contextAttribute>
16 </contextAttributeList>
17 <domainMetadata>
18 <contextMetadata>
19 <name>timestamp</name>
20 <type>dateTime</type>
21 <value>2015-03-16T15:23:17.234+0200</value>
22 </contextMetadata>
23 </domainMetadata>
24 </contextElement>
Listing 5: An example of Data Item.
In fact, we have a collection of data items in different data
sets. Thus, when the consumer’s request is defeasible provable.
These data items will be filtered or aggregated following the
request conditions before returning results to consumers. Every
transaction of data usage will be stored as new data items and
later reported to the data owners as possible.
IV. DATA HANDLING MECHANISM
This section provides an overview of the data handling
mechanism and an initial implementation of the usage control
module.
A. Overview
Fig. 3 shows the sequence of the proposed mechanism
for data handling, which is in the following steps: (1) Create
Usage Policy, (2) Send Data, (3) Request Data, (4) Process
Data Usage Enforcement, (5) Load Usage Policy, (6) Process
Data Usage Accountability, (7) Store Data Usage History, (8)
Response Data and Justification, and (9) Visualize Data Usage
History. Traditional flows are provided by steps (2), (3), and
a part of step (8) proposed traditionally (normal lines), but
steps (1), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) are added to implement
usage control and accounting (dotted lines).
Fig. 3: Simplified Data Handling Mechanism.
Next, we present the main defined functionalities of the
data owners, data consumers, and IoT trusted third party.
1) Data Owners: We first allow the data owners to create
the usage policy for their data set, and then data from their
sensor devices are sent to the shared platform. The data owners
also can visualize the data usage history and adjust the usage
policy as needed.
2) Data Consumers: The data consumers are able to re-
quest data using their applications. They can visualize not only
the responsed data but also the justification for trusting the
results.
3) IoT Shared Platform: The data collection and distribu-
tion will be managed in the Smart City Management Platform.
The Usage Control Module is provided in order to incorporate
transparency in how the data is used. It has three main
functionalities as follows: (i) Usage Policy Management for
managing data owner’s policies, (ii) Data Usage Enforcement
for reasoning consumer’s requests, and (iii) Data Usage Ac-
countability for tracing data usage history. We will explain
more the module in the next section.
B. Usage Control Module
This part will provide more detail about the technical
functionality of the usage control module which provided by
the shared platform. We also aim at initial implementing it
using SPINdle2, a logic reasoner that can be used to compute
the consequence of DUPO theories in an efficient manner [18].
1) Usage Policy Management: So far, we have explained
how the usage policies are defined in the previous sections,
from use case examples (section II) to defeasible logic rules
(section III). However, we need a practical way to manage
the policies. In this module, we suggest a rule based language
which build on Defeasible SPINdle, and later extend to De-
feasible RuleML3 as possible. We will go further to provide a
visual editor which supports data owners to define the policy
for diversity of obligations and constraints mentioned above,
and propose a DUPO service to load the related polices. For
prototype, we use SPINdle systax to define facts and rules of
usage policies in Listing 6.
1 # Facts
2 >> CO
3
4 # Usage policies
5 r1c: CO =>[P] SpatialScope(zone)
6 r2c: CO =>[F] -SpatialScope(zone)
7 r3c: CO =>[P] TemporalScope(weekly)
8 r4c: CO =>[F] -TemporalScope(weekly)
9 r5c: CO =>[P] AbstractScope(statistic)
10 r6c: CO =>[F] -AbstractScope(statistic)
11 ...
Listing 6: Facts and Usage Policies.
2) Data Usage Enforcement: This functionality aims to
process the consumer’s requests. Firstly, the request will be
transformed into defeasible rules. We then use the DUPO
service to load the related policies. Next, we deal with conflicts
between the usage policies and consumer’s request by setting
superiority relation between the defeasible rules. Finally, we
do reasoning to have the conclusions which are able to
demonstrate that the related policies are correctly enforced.
Listing 7 shows the consumer’s request, the defined superiority
relation, and reasoning conclusions from SPINdle engine.
1 # Consumer‘s request
2 r: CO,[P]SpatialScope(street),[P]TemporalScope(
hourly),[P]AbstractionScope(detail) =>[O]
ConsumerRequest
3
4 # Superiority relation
5 r1c > r
6 r2c > r
7 r3c > r
8 r4c > r
9 r5c > r
10 r6c > r
11 ...
12
13 # Conclusions
14 ===================
15 -D [O]ConsumerRequest(X)
16 -d [O]ConsumerRequest(X)
17 ...
Listing 7: Consumers’ Request, Superiority Relation and
Conclusions.
2SPINdle: http://spin.nicta.org.au/spindle/index.html
3Defeasible RuleML: http://ruleml.org/1.0/defeasible/defeasible.html
3) Data Usage Accountability: This functionality ensures
the accountability of policy enforcement and traceability of the
data usage history. We firstly define the justification [17] to
the consumers based on extending of the SPINdle Inference
Logger (as Listing 8). The data usage history is updated as
every consumers’ request is defeasible provable and responsed
data is processed.
1 === Inference Logger ===
2 Rule_00000
3 +-- [DEFEASIBLE] Discarded :- [-d [O]
ConsumerRequest(X)]
4 ...
Listing 8: Inference Logger.
V. RELATED WORK
Usage control is concerned with how data is used after
access to it has been granted. It has received attention in the
domain of the social networks. In particular authors in [6]
propose a simple accountability model and a platform that
allows users to explore the consequences of different usage
control choices. In addition, various efforts have been made
in the web domain to address accountability and trust [10]
[17]. Classic access control models have also been extended to
implement obligations and conditions in the context of access
to enterprise resources [8] and usage control mechanisms
are well studied by authors cited in [9]. Recently, in the
field of IoT, the work done by [7] they propose a privacy
policy model that allow users give control over their data
in context of smart grid application. However, our work is
designed to bring a rigorous approach to usage control in
the context of smart cities. We do not focus on the security
aspects such as confidentiality, access control, and privacy.
In fact, our paper deals with issues arising from applying
usage control policies based on spatio-temporal granularity,
abstraction/masking of certain information, and conditions by
class of actors or purposes. In this work, policies has been
built on deontic logic based on obligations, permissions and
prohibitions, as in regular defeasible logic rules. Thus, we build
on the work done in the area of DL by Governatori et al. [14]
[15], and then focus on the accountability and traceability of
data usage.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a new policy model for usage
control and its formalization using defeasible logic. We have
also illustrated the enforcement of the above policies using
SPINdle and the accounting mechanisms needed to ensure
confidence to the data providers that the data is being used in
a manner complaint to their policies. Two main contributions
proposed in this study advance the state of the art in this
domain. A new data usage policy, called DUPO, has been pre-
sented, including its conceptual model, formal language, and
practical expression. We also introduce a novel data handling
mechanism, including the definition and initial implementation
of data owners’, data consumers’, and Usage Control Module’
functionalities.
As future work, we aim to extend this study, with im-
plementation and validating of the proposed models in the
following directions: Firstly, experiment the proposed solution
to check the performance related aspects to ensure that the sys-
tem is efficient and scalable. Secondly, provide a visualization
tool to help users customize their policies in a manner that
allows them to explore the consequences of certain changes
and finally enhancement to the language to allow monetization
of data for example different levels of subscription or payment.
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